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Abstract:  
 
Objectives: Inspired by real-world examples from the forensic medical sciences domain, we seek to 
determine whether a decision about an interventional action could be subject to amendments on the 
basis of some incomplete information within the model, and whether it would be worthwhile for the 
decision maker to seek further information prior to suggesting a decision. 
 
Method: The method is based on the underlying principle of Value of Information to enhance decision 
analysis in interventional and counterfactual Bayesian networks. 
 
Results: The method is applied to two real-world Bayesian network models (previously developed 
for decision support in forensic medical sciences) to examine the average gain in terms of both Value 
of Information (average relative gain ranging from 11.45% and 59.91%) and decision making (potential 
amendments in decision making ranging from 0% to 86.8%). 
 
Conclusions: We have shown how the method becomes useful for decision makers, not only when 
decision making is subject to amendments on the basis of some unknown risk factors, but also when it 
is not. Knowing that a decision outcome is independent of one or more unknown risk factors saves us 
from the trouble of seeking information about the particular set of risk factors. Further, we have also 
extended the assessment of this implication to the counterfactual case and demonstrated how 
answers about interventional actions are expected to change when some unknown factors become 
known, and how useful this becomes in forensic medical science. 
 
Keywords: Causal inference, Bayesian networks, interventional analysis, counterfactual analysis, value 
of information, forensic medicine. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Value of Information (VoI) is a technique initially proposed 
in economics [1] for the purposes of: 
 
1. determining the amount a decision maker would be 
willing to pay for further information; and  
 
2. prioritising unobserved model factors for acquiring 
information based on their impact against a desired 
utility value or probability distribution. 
 
VoI analysis has subsequently been adopted in a number 
of domains including finance [2], supply chain 
management [3], pharmaceuticals [4], and health care [5].  
 An especially important application domain is 
medicine. For example, VoI has been used: 
   
1. as a decision analytic approach to clinical trial design 
and research priority-setting, by taking into 
consideration the costs of sampling, the benefits of 
the sample information, and the decision rules of the 
cost-effectiveness analysis [6]. 
2. to determine optimal sample size for clinical trials as 
an alternative to the more traditional null hypothesis 
methods [7, 8, 9, 10];  
 
3. for the development and evaluation of clinical trials 
[11, 12]; 
 
4. to investigate the expected value of partial perfect 
information, and the research decision it can address 
in medical decision making [13]; 
 
5. as a guide to evaluate decision support for 
differential diagnosis [14]; 
 
6. as a decision analysis technique to identify the most 
beneficial factors in health economic models [5, 15, 
16, 17]. 
 
For a comprehensive review of VoI analyses related to 
health risk management see [18]. 
 In this paper we are interested in using VoI to 
determine whether missing information can lead to 
different interventional actions in decision analysis with 
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Bayesian networks (BNs). The use of VoI for 
interventions has previously been explored in [19] where 
VoI is used to identify novel actions (a process which the 
authors call search for opportunities) in influence diagrams, 
in the sense that interventions are identified to improve a 
desirable utility function. More recently, in [20] VoI is 
also considered as an evaluation method for 
interventional strategies in epidemiology, under 
competing models, and to quantify the benefit of 
adaptive versus static intervention strategies. Our major 
contribution here is to extend VoI for interventional 
decision analysis to the counterfactual setting. This 
allows decision makers to compare the observed results 
of the actual world to those of a hypothetical world; i.e. 
what would have happened had we proposed treatment 
(or intervention) B instead of treatment A. To the best of 
our knowledge, there have been no previous attempts to 
incorporate the concept of VoI to counterfactual problems 
with BNs. 
 Our application of VoI is motivated by real-world 
problems in forensic medical sciences in which BNs were 
developed for decision making. BNs are based on sound 
foundations of causality and conditional probability 
theory. Our objective is to show how VoI can be applied 
to BNs to make them especially suitable for simulating 
interventions and inferring answers from counterfactual 
questions.   
 The paper is structured as follows: section 2 
describes the forensic medical science problem 
motivating this work; section 3 provides the necessary 
background overview of the methods: VoI, BNs, 
interventional and counterfactual analysis; section 4 
demonstrates the modelling process of integrating VoI 
analysis into interventional and counterfactual BN 
decision analysis models; section 5 demonstrates and 
discusses the results generated by applying the method 
to two real-world forensic medical case studies; we 
provide our concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
 
2 Motivation: The forensic mental health problem 
Forensic medical practitioners and scientists based at the 
Violence Prevention Research Unit1 (VPRU); Queen Mary 
University of London have, for several years, sought 
improved decision support for determining care and 
release of people with mental health problems. In 
particular, they are interested in managing the risk of 
violent reoffending by releasing such convicted prisoners 
from prison and discharging such patients from medium 
secure services [21]. In collaboration with the medical 
                                                            
1 Formerly known as Forensic Psychiatry Research Unit (FPRU). 
practitioners we have developed two BN models for this 
purpose – one for prisoners and one for patients [22, 23]. 
These models delivered significantly improved 
predictive accuracy with respect to whether a 
prisoner/patient is determined suitable for 
release/discharge (hereafter referred to simply as 
'release'). The models also provided the additional 
benefits that causal BN models provide over and above 
black-box decision models (see Chapters 2 and 3 of [24] 
for a detailed discussion). However, while, those models 
were developed for the purpose of simulating 
interventions (i.e. treatments/therapies) for violence risk 
management, prior to releasing an individual, they did 
not consider the possibility that decisions about release 
could be subject to amendments on the basis of some 
incomplete information within the model. The BN 
models were large and complex. Consequently, when 
assessing an individual for release, information was very 
often missing for variables that could have been 
observed2. 
 Specifically, a decision maker (such as a 
probation officer or a clinician) has to determine whether 
to release a prisoner/patient based on the probability 
distribution (or the expected value) of the hypothesis 
variable; i.e. the risk of violence assuming release. Prior 
to deciding on release, the decision maker has the option 
to simulate various interventions for the purpose of 
determining whether an individual's risk of violence can 
be managed to acceptable levels. Additionally, the 
decision maker may have the option to gather further 
information about the individual. While any set of 
                                                            
2 Some variables in BNs are supposed to be unobserved. For instance, 
specific type of latent or uncertain synthetic variables. These also 
include variables representing symptoms post-treatment, on the basis 
of some imperfect intervention (see figure 3). In this paper we are only 
interested in variables with missing information; i.e. those that are not 
observed, but could have been observed. 
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1) A BN with no observations; marginal 
probabilities are displayed. The tables 
represent the prior probabilities (for the node 
Test this is conditional on Disease)  
2) A BN with observations about the cause, and 
posterior probabilities about the effect. 
3) A BN with observations about the effect, 
and posterior probabilities about the cause. 
 
 
Figure 1. A BN in its simplest form, based on the probability example in [25], demonstrating how prior probability is revised to posterior 
probability given the specified evidence, from cause to effect and vice versa. 
 
unknown information can still be estimated on the basis 
of Bayesian inference (via observations provided to other 
relevant factors within the BN model) it is still possible 
that knowing (rather than estimating) one or more of 
these unobserved factors, may lead to amendments in the 
probation officer's original decision about release. 
 
3 Methods 
While a detailed description of the four constituent 
methods, BNs, VoI analysis, interventional and 
counterfactual analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, 
this section provides sufficient background to 
understand the modelling process demonstrated in 
section 4.  
 
  3.1. Bayesian networks (BNs) 
 
BNs, also sometimes known as belief networks or causal 
probabilistic networks, are directed acyclic graphical 
models [26]. They consist of nodes which represent 
uncertain variables, and arcs which represent causal or 
influential relationships between the variables. The 
'Bayesian' in BNs is due to the use of Bayes' theorem for 
revising probabilities. Bayes' theorem is a simple 
equation that specifies how to calculate conditional 
probabilities: 
 
       
           
    
 
 
where p(A) is the prior probability of A and p(B|A) is the 
likelihood of B given A. The probability p(A|B) is called 
the posterior probability of A. In its prior state all of the 
variables in a BN are uncertain and assumed to be 
provisional upon experience/data gained to date. This 
prior probability is then revised based on new 
experience/data, to provide the updated posterior 
probability. 
Figure 1 presents a very simple BN with just two 
variables and one dependency. The example is based on 
a well-known probability problem [25], where a test to 
detect a disease whose prevalence is 1 in a 1000 has a 
false-positive rate of 5%. Figure 1.1 presents this problem 
with both variables being unknown (i.e. the prior 
marginal probabilities reflecting the average individual). 
Further, figure 1.2 presents the posterior probabilities for 
Test given the two possible knowns for Disease, whereas 
figure 1.3 presents the posterior probabilities for Disease 
given the two possible knowns for Test. While case (2) 
demonstrates how the cause node affects the 
probabilities of the effect node, case (3) demonstrates 
how inference propagates backwards to the cause node 
having observed the effect, and this is what makes BNs 
unique for decision analysis. For further reading in BNs 
see [27, 24]. 
 
  3.2. Value of Information 
 
VoI analysis was introduced in economics to assess 
investment decision problems, but is increasingly used in 
a broader range of applications (see [28]). Figure 2 
presents a very simple typical investment decision 
problem, with BNs. In this example, the question one 
would expect the VoI analysis to answer is "what is the 
profit gain of knowing Economic growth prior to making a 
decision about Investment". 
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Figure 2. The investment decision problem with BNs. 
 
Table 1 presents the expected monetary value for 
Profit (p), given Economic growth (e) and Investment (i). 
The table indicates that returns from bonds are 
independent of fluctuations in economic growth (over 
some fixed period of time). On the other hand, 
fluctuations in economic growth are expected to affect 
the returns from investing in stocks and gold. 
 
Table 1. Table for Profit p, where e is Economic growth and i is Investment. 
 
e Negative Even Positive 
i Bon. Sto. Gol. Bon. Sto. Gol. Bon. Sto. Gol. 
p £30 -£1000 -£300 £30 £50 £75 £30 £400 £150 
 
 If we randomly make an investment decision i, 
without further information, the expected value (EV) for 
p is £96.25 (i.e. each action is assigned a prior probability 
of 
 
 
). Given that e is unknown, we would like to make a 
decision about investment i that maximises profit p. This 
is defined as the expected maximum value (EMV); thus,  
 
        
 
       
 
       
 
where      is the payoff table for row index i (which 
describes the possible actions for the decision maker, i.e. 
the investment decision) and column index e (which 
describes the uncertain variable for which the decision 
maker does not have knowledge, i.e. the unknown 
Economic growth), that has probability    of being in state 
i. In the BN example presented in figure 2, the equivalent 
required calculation process3 would be to simply iterate 
through observations i and pick the observable state that 
maximises p, while e is uncertain. 
                                                            
3 AgenaRisk, which is a BN tool (Agena, 2015), allows the user to run 
the three different scenarios in a single model. AgenaRisk also allows 
continuous variables to be incorporated into the model (i.e. such as the 
Profit node in figure 2) without any constraint for static discretisation 
and with the ability to define any statistical distribution. This is 
achieved by the use of the dynamic discretisation algorithm (Neil et al., 
2010) which uses entropy errors as the basis for approximation. 
 However, we want to know the gain when e is 
known, prior to making a decision for i. This is defined 
as the expected value of perfect information (EVPI). 
Specifically, this is     given perfect information (PI) for 
e (or        ), where for each possible direction of e the 
investment decision i that maximises p is always selected 
as shown below: 
 
               
 
      
 
 
 
Therefore, if we were able to know the direction of 
economic growth we would have expected to increase 
our EV for p, on average, from £172.5 to £281.75. Thus, 
knowing e is worth: 
 
                                   . 
 
Specifically, the maximum value the decision maker 
should be willing to pay for perfect information is 
£109.25.  
 By definition, the EVPI represents the potential 
gain associated with having perfect information on all of 
the unknown model factors. For the decision maker, it is 
often more useful to assess VoI for individual or subsets 
of unknown factors, rather than assessing all unknown 
factors collectively. This is defined as the expected value of 
partially perfect information (EVPPI); this has the same 
equation to that of EVPI, but for a selected subset of 
unknown model variables. In the simple example 
demonstrated above there was only a single unknown 
factor and so the EVPPI of knowing that individual factor 
is equivalent to the EVPI. In this paper, however, we are 
interested in more complex models with multiple 
unknown factors and, therefore, we are interested in the 
EVPPI.  
 
  3.3. Interventional analysis 
 
Interventional analysis in BNs enables decision makers to 
prioritise interventions based on evidence [29, 30]. An 
intervention is an action that can be performed to 
manipulate the effect of some desirable future outcome. 
In medical decision analysis, an intervention is typically 
represented by some treatment, which can affect a 
patient's health outcome. These are typically described as 
imperfect interventions; implying that the intervention 
induces a distribution over outcome states, rather than a 
specific state; i.e. perfect interventions [31, 32]. As a result, 
the effectiveness of an imperfect intervention is expected 
to be dependent on some other factors. In medicine, 
other such factors can be responsiveness and motivation for 
treatment [22, 23]. We will call these interventional factors.  
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 Figure 3 demonstrates an example of how an 
observational BN model is expected to change when it is 
used for imperfect interventional analysis. The top model 
represents the observational phase and assumes:  
  
1. delusions and anxiety may cause anger; 
 
2. anger and lack of self-control may cause 
uncontrolled aggression; 
 
3. treatment for anger, which in this case represents the 
doctor's historical frequency in prescribing 
treatments, depends on symptoms of anger and/or 
uncontrolled aggression; 
 
4. motivation to attend treatment and responsiveness to 
treatment typically depend on the type of treatment 
(there could be multiple mutual exclusive treatments 
for anger). 
 
The bottom model represents the interventional phase. 
Any parent links from causes entering intervention (such 
as Treatment for anger) are expected to be removed. This is 
because we do not want to infer posterior probabilities 
for causes when indicating an intervention, which has to 
be either true of false, as it happens in the observational 
phase where the model proceeds to explain the 
observation for treatment.  
In the example of figure 3, the intervention 
imperfectly manipulates Anger and this assumes that 
some other interventional factors exist, which determine 
the effectiveness of the intervention. In our case these 
factors were (according to the experts) Motivation to 
attend treatment and Responsiveness to treatment; implying 
that the transformation from an observational to an 
interventional model is not always deterministic, at least 
in the case of imperfect interventions. As a result, both of 
these interventional factors influence Anger post-treatment 
in the interventional phase, since the effectiveness of 
Treatment for anger is dependent upon them. The example 
also demonstrates that it is possible for the intervention 
to serve as the child node of the Effect in observational 
models, but this link should be reversed (if not removed) 
in the interventional model. Specifically, in the 
observational model we would expect evidence of Anger 
to increase the chance for a doctor to propose Treatment 
for anger, whereas in the interventional model we would 
expect Treatment for anger to manipulate symptoms of 
Anger. This does not appear to have been discussed in 
previous relevant research [30, 31, 32].  
 We have demonstrated the process of an 
imperfect intervention. If the intervention perfectly 
manipulates the effect node then the decision maker may 
express this directly into the effect node, rather than 
specifying a new probability function, in which case the 
effect node is now the variable that should be 
manipulated independently of its causes. The process of 
intervening on an event that becomes independent of all 
its causes is known as graph surgery [30]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of how an observational BN model transforms 
into an interventional BN model [33]. Dashed nodes 4  and arcs are 
introduced in the interventional phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 The node Anger serves as the prior for Anger post-treatment. 
Accepted for publication in Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, version 12.10.2015. 
 
7 
 
  3.4. Counterfactual analysis 
 
Counterfactual analysis in BNs enables decision makers 
to compare the observed results in the real world to those 
of a hypothetical world; what actually happened and 
what would have happened under some different 
scenario.  
  
 
 
Figure 4. The example BN model prior to performing counterfactual 
analysis. 
 
Let us consider the BN model presented in figure 
4. In this example, we are interested in the outcome of 
the node Anger. Suppose that we observe that Anger is 
true, without knowledge of either Anxiety or Delusions, 
but with knowledge that Stress is also true. We want to 
answer the following question: "given that Anger and 
Stress are true, what is the probability that Anger would (still) 
have been true if we had also known that Anxiety was false?". 
To answer this counterfactual question, we make use of 
the twin-network method proposed by Pearl [30]. 
However, it should also be noted that Dawid [34] 
proposed a decision-theoretic alternative, which is based 
on the argument that potential outcomes are inherently 
metaphysical and that counterfactual models for causal 
inference can be misleading. These issues relating to 
counterfactuals and causal inference are discussed 
further in [35, 36]. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the application of the 
twin-network method, where a network representing the 
actual world is connected to another (twin) network 
representing the hypothetical world. Both networks 
share the background variables Substance misuse and 
Stress, since those remain invariant under modification 
[30]. Anxiety represents an observation in the actual 
world, whereas in the hypothetical world we are 
intervening on Anxiety' and hence, we have to follow the 
process of graph surgery, whereby the variable under 
perfect manipulation becomes independent from its 
causes. As a result, dashed arcs entering Anxiety' are 
removed. This leaves us with a model in which Anger 
and Stress are true in the actual world, and Anxiety' and 
Stress are respectively false and true in the hypothetical 
world. The variable Anger' in the hypothetical world 
provides the answer to the counterfactual question. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Applying the twin-network modelling technique to the BN model of Figure 4 to answer the counterfactual question about Anger'. Dashed 
arcs entering Anxiety' in the hypothetical world are removed since the specified variable is under perfect manipulation. 
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4 The modelling process 
In developing interventional and counterfactual BNs we 
first require the standard observational model that is 
typically used for prediction. From there, we can 
construct interventional and counterfactual BNs as 
described in section 3. The process is presented in figure 
6 and illustrates how we may proceed from an 
observational BN model to: 
 
1. counterfactual analysis without interventions,  
2. interventional analysis with interventions, and 
subsequently to  
3. counterfactual analysis that incorporates those 
interventions. 
 
At each of these stages decisions will be analysed, and 
VoI analysis can be used to determine whether 
amendments are expected in the decisions under 
analysis, on the basis of some incomplete information 
within the model. In this paper, we are interested in 
modelling stages beyond the observational phase.   
 To demonstrate the process, the starting 
observational model is a simplified version of the real-
world BN models from the domain of forensic psychiatry 
(see top part of figure 7) that were described in section 2. 
These models concern individuals with serious mental 
health problems who are about to be released. By using 
the above modelling process we can perform the 
following decision and risk analysis: 
 
1. Risk assessment: The observational BN model is used 
to assess the risk of violence for the given individual, 
over a specified time period, in case of release. 
 
2. Risk management: An interventional BN model is used 
to examine whether the risk of violence for the given 
individual can be managed to acceptable levels. This 
is achieved by simulating interventional actions to 
manipulate, directly or indirectly, the estimated risk 
of violence. 
 
3. What if risk analysis: A counterfactual BN model is 
used post-release to study individuals who were 
violent, and examine whether their risk of violence 
could have been managed better at the assessment 
phase. 
 
In [22, 23] only (1) was covered and thus, the new 
modelling process provides a much enhanced decision-
support system. In what follows we focus on (2) and (3) 
which are respectively demonstrated in subsections 4.1 
and 4.2 by incorporating the VoI analysis concept. 
 The decision maker may be interested in whether 
a decision about an interventional action could be subject 
to amendments on the basis of reducing model 
uncertainty. This interest is also extended to the 
counterfactual case whereby decision analysis based on 
counterfactual manipulations may also be subject to 
amendments. VoI analysis is used to determine whether 
there are expectations that would make seeking 
information about those unknown risk factors 
worthwhile prior to suggesting any interventional 
actions. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The complete modelling process. The dashed link highlights 
the stage at which we determine whether further information is 
required prior to proceeding with the decision suggested by the model. 
  
 Figure 7 shows how the simplified forensic 
medical model is modified from an observational model 
into its interventional stage; i.e. after graph surgery has 
been performed (as demonstrated in subsection 3.3). We 
are interested in the interventional model. This 
simplified version is presented with subjective 
probabilities for the sake of demonstration. The 
conditional probability tables (CPTs) for each node5, of 
the interventional model, are provided in appendix A.  
Specifically, in this simplified version we 
consider that: 
 
1. A decision to release an individual depends on the 
individual's risk6 of violence. We assume: no release if 
this risk is >50%; release if <20%; otherwise release with 
supervision. This decision making occurs in the 
observational phase. In the interventional phase, a 
                                                            
5  No CPTs are provided for interventional variables since they can 
either be true (perform intervention) or false (do not perform 
intervention). 
6 In this example we simply use the EV of the probability distribution 
for decision making. Other alternatives include the probability 
distribution itself, or some expected utility derived from the probability 
distribution. 
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decision about release is modelled as an intervention 
that either reduces or eliminates the risk of violence. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. An example of how an observational BN model transforms 
into an interventional BN model, based on a simplified forensic mental 
health BN in [22, 23]. Squared nodes indicate interventions, whereas the 
diamond-shaped node is treated as a probabilistic utility node on which 
the decision of R is based, in the observational phase, and which either 
perfectly or imperfectly manipulates V, in the interventional phase. 
 
2. Violence depends on violent ideation and uncontrolled 
aggression. 
3. Violent ideation depends on delusions and background 
of extreme violent behaviour. 
 
4. Uncontrolled aggression depends on anger and 
disinhibition, which is caused by substance misuse. 
 
5. Delusions, anger and substance misuse can be 
imperfectly manipulated, in the interventional 
model, with the respective interventions of Treatment 
for mental illness, Treatment for anger, and Treatment for 
substance misuse. In the observational model, 
treatments are observational variables that simply 
indicate the probability of a particular treatment to 
be suggested on the basis of one or more relevant 
symptoms. 
 
 In what follows we make use of the VoI 
abbreviations from subsection 3.2, and the notation 
provided to the model variables of figure 7. The variable 
V, which represents the probability an individual is 
violent post-release, is treated as a utility node on which 
VoI analysis is performed. However, we are not directly 
interested in the fluctuations of V, as in the standard 
concept of VoI, but rather whether such fluctuations are 
sufficient for the expected decision (ED) for action R to 
change, on the basis of reducing model uncertainty.  
  
4.1. VoI for Interventional Bayesian networks 
 
Interventional analysis is understood to be particularly 
useful in terms of decision making for release. For 
example, an individual who is believed to pose a high 
risk of violence could still be released if the model 
indicates that his risk of violence can be managed to 
acceptable levels on the basis of some intervention/s. 
 Due to the size and complexity of the BN 
models, interventional analysis is typically performed 
with some missing information about an individual's risk 
factors for violence. We would like to know whether the 
gain from knowing one, or more, of these risk factors is 
sufficiently strong to amend a desired interventional 
action. 
 Suppose that we know that a particular 
individual under assessment for release a) suffers from 
delusions, b) suffers from anger problems, and c) has a 
background of extreme violent behaviour. At this stage, 
relevant treatments are yet to be suggested; implying 
that all of the interventions are still set to false. 
 Based on the above set of information, the 
         ; implying no release. The expected minimum7 
value for V (    ) can be calculated by iterating through 
                                                            
7 Note that for this example we are interested in minimising the target 
value (i.e. the risk of violence), rather than maximising profit. 
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the possible states for Td and Ta, which represent the 
treatments that could be suggested based on known 
relevant symptoms, and selecting the combined set of 
states that minimise V; i.e. when both treatments are true.  
 
Specifically, 
 
        
     
           
 
        
 
As a result, the model suggests no release even when 
accounting for     . 
 However, we have no information about S. We 
would like to know whether it would be sensible not to 
release the individual without knowing S. To find this 
answer we have to calculate       , and in doing so take 
into account Ts as an additional minimiser for V. 
Specifically,  
 
               
        
             
 
 
 
                                    
 
As a result, knowing S is expected to reduce the EmV for 
V, on average, from 0.5034 down to 0.4828. Thus, the gain 
from knowing S is worth: 
 
                                  
 
but in terms of decision making for R, knowing S is 
expected to amend action R since            . We will 
refer to this outcome as the expected decision for R (   ); 
i.e. the     when S remains unknown is no release, 
whereas when S becomes known then the     becomes 
release with supervision. This may sound counterintuitive 
on the basis that knowledge of S might mean knowledge 
that the individual is a substance misuser. However, the 
key concept here is that if we had known that the 
individual was a substance misuser, we would have 
arranged for a suitable treatment; whereas without 
knowing S it is impossible to arrange such a treatment 
and thus, we risk not treating the individual in the case 
where S is true. 
 This simple example demonstrates how the 
concept of VoI analysis can be implemented to help the 
decision maker avoid suggesting potentially erroneous 
interventional actions on the basis of ignoring some 
unknown risk factors that could amend a decision for a 
given interventional action. 
 
 
  
4.2. VoI for Counterfactual Bayesian networks 
 
Counterfactual analysis can provide clinicians and 
probation officers who work in these areas the ability to 
assess a case whereby an act of violence that has already 
been observed post-release could have been managed 
better if they had known some further information that 
was not considered at the assessment phase. This could 
possibly serve as a lesson learnt for future such cases. 
 Consider the example of an individual who was 
violent after release, in which at the assessment phase for 
release, the probation officer concluded that the 
individual a) did not have a background of extreme 
violent behaviour, and b) did not suffer from substance 
misuse. This led to the decision to release the individual 
without the need for any sort of treatments, implying 
that all of the three interventional actions were set to 
false.  
 After the individual became violent, a new piece 
of information is observed: that the individual's act of 
violence was based on cultural, ethnic, and religious 
incentives. This factor was not considered by the model 
at the assessment phase. If the probation officer had 
considered this factor, and had also been aware of the 
individual's incentives, he could have used the model to 
analyse the revised risk of violence by also considering 
relevant interventions for managing the risk of this 
factor, such as some sort of spiritual care. The relevant 
counterfactual question in this case is: Given that the 
individual was violent post-release, what would be the 
probability for violence had we also known that he had 
Cultural, ethnic, and religious incentives for violence and, on 
that basis, the probation officer had instructed some sort of 
spiritual care. 
 This counterfactual problem now involves 
external factors that must be taken into consideration. 
This requires a slightly revised model which incorporates 
the additional factors. The resulting new/revised CPTs 
considered for demonstrating this counterfactual case are 
provided in appendix B. 
 Our observations in the actual world now consist 
of both those observed at the assessment phase as well as 
those observed post-release. These are presented in 
figure 8, which shows how the model of figure 7 is 
modified using the twin-network method described in 
section 3.4. Figure 8 also provides additional notation for 
the new variables.  
 From the assessment phase we know: 
 
S = false, Ts = false, Ta = false, Td = false, and B = false.  
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We also learnt that post-release: 
 
V = true and C = true (the new variable).  
 
On the other hand, the counterfactual question of 
spiritual care comes into effect only in the hypothetical 
world. At this stage, there are seven background 
variables; i.e. the five presented in the middle section of 
figure 8, plus Td and D (the dashed nodes, Td’ and D’, 
come into effect later with a modified version of this 
example). The     = 0.5577 prior to suggesting spiritual 
care on the basis of C', whereas the 
 
         
  
         
  
        
 
where Sc minimises V'; i.e. if the probation officer had 
suggested spiritual care. Therefore, with       
providing the answer to the counterfactual question we 
can conclude that the particular individual would not 
have been released had we have known his cultural, 
ethnic, and religious incentives, even when accounting 
for spiritual care. 
 However, this suggestion comes without having 
information about either delusions or anger. We would 
like to know whether the suggestion for hypothetical 
action no release is expected to be subject to amendments 
if we had reduced model uncertainty. We test this in the 
case of delusions. Hence, the model requires some 
modification. 
Figure 8 indicates how the twin-network model 
is altered in order to manipulate delusions in the 
hypothetical world. Specifically, at this stage the dashed 
nodes Td’ and D’ are introduced, whereas the previously 
background variables D and Td become specific to the 
actual world and thus, the dashed links entering Dt' are 
removed. We therefore have to calculate         and in 
doing so, we also have to take into account Td' as an 
additional minimiser for V’. As a result, in this extended 
counterfactual case, Dt' is dependent on the new set of 
variables D' and Td'. The EV for V' when D' is known is 
 
                 
      
          
  
 
 
                                       
 
Thus, while the gain from knowing D' is just worth  
 
                                    
 
the discrepancy is enough to alter the      from no release 
(when D' was unknown) to release with supervision (when 
D' is known). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Using the twin-network method to answer the counterfactual question for V'. The counterfactual BN model also indicates the 
modifications required to accommodate the           as discussed in subsection 4.2 (i.e. a new instance of the background variables Td and D is 
created in the hypothetical world, and dashed links entering Dt' are removed).  
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5 Real-world case studies and discussion 
In the previous section we demonstrated how the 
concept of VoI analysis can be used to examine the 
implications of model uncertainty on decision analysis 
for interventional actions, in both interventional and 
counterfactual BN models. The implications have been 
demonstrated on the basis of limited fluctuations of the 
EV of the hypothesis variable on which an interventional 
action of interest is based, but which were sufficient for 
the ED to change. In an effort to keep the examples 
simple, the VoI analysis was restricted to a single 
unknown risk factor that could only be manipulated by a 
single intervention. 
In this section we assess the implications further 
by applying the method to the two BNs discussed in 
section 2, which represent two real-world applications to 
forensic medical problems, and examine the average gain 
one would expect to observe in terms of both VoI and 
decision making based on real data. The model presented 
in [22] is called DSVM-MSS, and the model presented in 
[23] is called DSVM-P. We will use these two terms to 
distinguish between the two models. 
 We have performed six experiments in total; two 
for DSVM-P, one for the interventional and another for 
the counterfactual case, and four for DSVM-MSS, two for 
the interventional and two for the counterfactual case. 
The experiments are double in the case of DSVM-MSS 
because it incorporates two variables of interest; violent 
convictions and general violence, whereas DSVM-P only 
assesses violent convictions. The experiments are 
summarised as follows: 
 
a) The interventional case: This is done by examining 
the average percentage gain expected by simulating 
a number of interventions on relevant symptoms 
that can be manipulated by these interventions, as 
defined within the models. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
reported in table 2 represent the cases of DSVM-P 
for violent convictions, and DSVM-MSS for violent 
convictions and general violence respectively. 
  
b) The counterfactual case: This is done by examining 
the average percentage gain expected by simulating 
a number of interventions on relevant symptoms in 
the hypothetical world, as defined within the 
models, and after having observed that an 
individual had been violent post-release. Therefore, 
this assessment is restricted to cases for which the 
individuals have been found to be violent over the 
follow-up period (an average of 5 years for the 
DSVM-P study and an average of 1 year for the 
DSVM-MSS study). Experiments 4, 5, and 6 
reported in table 2 represent the cases of DSVM-P 
for violent convictions, and DSVM-MSS for violent 
convictions and general violence respectively. 
 
The experiments assume that the variables targeted for 
intervention (eleven for DSVM-P and five for DSVM-
MSS) are unobserved at the observational phase. The 
experiments also assume that, in the case whereby an 
intervention manipulates multiple variables, at most one 
such variable is observed (which is enough to activate 
the intervention) at random, during both the 
interventional and counterfactual assessments.  
 
Table 2. Absolute (ABS) and relative (RLT) gain observed, in terms of 
p(O) being true, for each of the experiments described in section 5, 
where VtI is the number of variables (i.e. symptoms) targeted for 
intervention, I is the number of available interventions, and p(O) is the 
initial average probability for the outcome of interest (i.e. violent 
convictions or general violence). 
  
 
E 
Data  
instances 
 
VtI 
 
I 
 
p(O) 
ABS  
Gain 
RLT  
Gain 
1 953 11 4 32.94% -03.77% -11.45% 
2 386 5 3 03.25% -00.50% -15.27% 
3 386 5 3 12.03% -05.35% -44.49% 
4 240 11 4 32.65% -12.48% -38.60% 
5 11 5 3 03.34% -00.68% -20.42% 
6 44 5 3 14.82% -08.88% -59.91% 
       
 The results from table 2 show that while DSVM-
P incorporates a higher number of variables available to 
be targeted for intervention, as well as a higher number 
of interventions, it does not seem to generate a higher 
relative average gain compared to DSVM-MSS. 
Essentially, the average gain also depends on the 
structure of the network, the impact of the interventions 
as defined within the model, as well as on the application 
domain. 
 Figure 9 demonstrates the average gain in terms 
of ED for the average individual and for each of the six 
experiments. The results are separated into four different 
threshold levels in determining release based on the risk 
of violence; i.e. when Θ=0.1 we assume that the 
individual is suitable for release if his or her risk of 
violence is lower than 10%. The dashed line indicates the 
shift towards an increased chance of the average 
individual determined as being suitable for release. 
Specifically, and based on various decision thresholds, 
the potential amendments in decision making ranged 
between 0% and 18.73% for the interventional case, and 
0% to 86.80% for the counterfactual case. Note that the 
gain is 0% only for the cases whereby 100% of the 
individuals had already been identified suitable for 
release, according to the hypothetical threshold levels, 
prior to examining any potential interventions. 
The results show that, while the level of gain 
depends on the model and outcome under assessment, 
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the method is generally useful in terms of supporting the 
decision makers with regards to whether ED is subject to 
amendments. Naturally, a higher expected gain, whether 
absolute or relative as presented in table 2, is associated 
with more frequent amendments in ED. It is also 
important to note that, with respect to the counterfactual 
case, the experiments have not considered the possibility 
of external factors being introduced in the hypothetical 
world, as demonstrated in the example of section 4.2. It is 
understood that the gain associated to the counterfactual 
case has the potential to increase greatly under such 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The average gain, when applying the method to each of the 
six experiments performed, in terms of ED for the average individual 
and with respect to being determined suitable for release at various 
threshold levels Θ. The solid line indicates the average model 
expectations prior to applying the method, whereas the dashed line 
indicates the shift towards an increased chance of the average 
individual determined as being suitable for release, after the method 
has been applied.  
6 Concluding remarks 
The concept of VoI analysis has been widely studied, 
primarily with influence diagrams, for observational and 
interventional cases. The novelty of our work here is to 
show how VoI can be used directly with BNs for 
interventional and especially counterfactual cases. Our 
application of VoI is also somewhat different from 
standard use. Typically, VoI is used for a) determining 
the amount a decision maker would be willing to pay for 
further information, and b) prioritising unknown factors 
for acquiring additional information based on their 
impact against a desired utility value or probability 
distribution.  
 In this paper, we used VoI analysis to determine 
whether a decision about an interventional action could 
be subject to amendments on the basis of some 
incomplete information within the model, and whether it 
would be worthwhile for the decision maker to seek 
further information prior to suggesting a decision. We 
have described a method to incorporate VoI analysis into 
BNs to enhance decision analysis in medical applications 
concerned with interventional actions. That is, we have 
also shown how the underlying principle of VoI analysis 
becomes useful, not only when decision making is 
subject to amendments, but also when it is not. Knowing 
that a decision outcome is independent of one or more 
unknown risk factors saves us from the trouble of 
seeking information about the particular set of risk 
factors. Further, we have also extended the assessment of 
this implication to the counterfactual case and 
demonstrated how answers about interventional actions 
are expected to change when some unknown factors 
become known, and how useful this becomes in forensic 
medical science. 
The process of VoI, which can be seen as an 
extension to sensitivity analysis [17, 37], can be 
automated8 to examine amendments in the EDs on the 
basis of some relevant interventional actions of interest. 
In contrast, interventional and especially counterfactual 
BNs will typically require careful reconstruction, from 
observational BNs, that might not always be consistent 
and in some cases might require expert contribution (see 
Figs. 3, 7 and 8). While Pearl has provided the basic 
formal underpinning of these processes [30], they appear 
to suffer from some limitations and as a result, some 
extensions of these processes (e.g. such as from perfect to 
imperfect interventions as discussed in the previous 
sections) have been proposed [32, 40, 41]. The scalability 
challenges in performing such extended VoI analysis are 
being addressed in [42]. 
 Real-world decision making is hindered by 
severe uncertainties, and these uncertainties are typically 
expected to increase greatly when the decision problem 
incorporates interventional and counterfactual questions. 
While in this paper we have focused our analysis on 
forensic medical sciences, the modelling process still 
                                                            
8 The BN models presented in this paper do not incorporate continuous 
variables for unobserved factors that can be manipulated. Performing 
VoI on continuous variables typically requires some complex 
approximations. In [38] we demonstrate how to perform VoI analysis in 
BNs using Dynamic Discretisation [39]. 
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applies to any other similar real-world problem that 
incorporates interventional and counterfactual Bayesian 
simulations. 
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Appendix A: CPTs for the interventional BN model of 
Figure 7 
 
Table A.1. CPT for Delusions (D), Anger (A), Substance misuse (S), and 
Background of extreme violent behaviour (B). 
 
Delusions Anger Substance 
misuse 
Back. of extreme 
violent beh. 
False 0.6 False 0.4 False 0.2 False 0.8 
True 0.4 True 0.6 True 0.8 True 0.2 
 
Table A.2. CPT for Delusions post treatment (Dt). 
 
Delusions False True 
Treat. for mental illness False True False True 
False 1 1 0 0.6 
True 0 0 1 0.4 
 
Table A.3. CPT for Anger post treatment (At). 
 
Anger False True 
Treatment for anger False True False True 
False 1 1 0 0.3 
True 0 0 1 0.7 
 
Table A.4. CPT for Substance misuse post treatment (St). 
 
Substance misuse False True 
Substance misuse treat. False True False True 
False 1 1 0 0.7 
True 0 0 1 0.3 
 
Table A.6. CPT for Disinhibition (Di). 
 
Substance misuse post treat. False True 
False 1 0.2 
True 0 0.8 
Table A.7. CPT for Violent ideation (Vi). 
 
Back. of extreme violent beh. False True 
Delusions post treatment False True False True 
False 1 0.8 0.6 0.1 
True 0 0.2 0.4 0.9 
 
Table A.8. CPT for Uncontrolled aggression (U). 
 
Anger post treatment False True 
Disinhibition False True False True 
False 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 
True 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 
 
Table A.9. CPT for Violence (V). 
 
Violent ideation False True 
Uncontrolled aggression False True False True 
p(Violence=true) 0.05 0.3 0.55 0.75 
 
Appendix B: New/Revised CPTs for the actual-world 
BN model of Figure 8. 
 
Note that CPTs for nodes Cultural, ethnic, or religious 
incentives (C & C') and Spiritual care  (Sc) are not provided 
since these variables are observable (i.e. set to true), in the 
example, without any parent nodes. The outcome of 
interest is retained whatever the CPT values provided. 
 
Table B.1. CPT for Violent ideation (Vi & Vi'), where CERI  is Cultural, 
ethnic, or religious incentives, BEVB is Background of extreme violent 
behaviour, and DPT is Delusions post treatment. 
 
CERI False True 
BEVB False True False True 
DPT False True False True False True False True 
False 1 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.01 
True 0 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.99 
 
Table B.2. CPT for Violence (V & V'). 
 
Violent ideation False True 
Uncontrolled aggression False True False True 
p(Violence=true) 0.05 0.3 0.75 0.9 
 
Table B.3. CPT for Cultural, ethnic, or religious incentives post care 
(Cc). 
 
Cultural, ethnic, or religious 
incentives 
False True 
Spiritual care False True False True 
False 1 0.8 0.6 0.1 
True 0 0.2 0.4 0.9 
 
 
